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Abstract 
 
The decision to settle a motor insurance claim by either 
negotiation or trial is analysed. This decision may depend on 
how risk and confrontation adverse or pessimistic the 
claimant is. The extent to which these behavioural features of 
the claimant might influence the final compensation amount 
are examined. An empirical analysis, fitting a switching 
regression model to a Spanish database, is conducted in order 
to analyze whether the choice of the conflict resolution 
procedure is endogenous to the compensation outcomes. The 
results show that compensations awarded by courts are always 
higher, although 95% of cases are settled by negotiation. We 
show that this is because claimants are adverse to risk and 
confrontation, and are pessimistic about their chances at trial. 
By contrast, insurers are risk /confrontation neutral and more 
objective in relation to the expected trial compensation. 
During the negotiation insurers accept to pay the subjective 
compensation values of claimants, since these values are lower 
than their estimates of compensations at trial. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Under fault-based systems injured victims involved in a motor collision are entitled to claim 
compensation for damages from the at-fault driver. When the driver is insured, and in the 
European Union motor liability insurance is compulsory, victims are compensated by insurance 
companies. The amount of financial compensation depends on numerous factors, such as the 
extent of the victim’s bodily injury, the economic losses sustained as a consequence of the 
accident, or whether the responsibility for the collision is shared with the insured driver. All these 
factors are derived from the accident, although the amount of compensation may also be 
influenced by external aspects such as the disputing skills of litigants or the resolution procedure 
followed, i.e. negotiation or trial. 
 
A widely accepted belief is that compensations awarded by trial are greater than those settled by 
negotiation. However, if this is the case why do victims prefer a negotiation procedure when 
claiming compensation for damages caused by an automobile accident? In Spain most motor 
bodily injury claims are settled by negotiation, with fewer than five per cent of cases going to 
court. Similar percentages are observed in other countries like the UK or the USA (Derrig and 
Rempala, 2006; Lewis, 2006). Given this apparent paradox we decided to conduct an empirical 
study, using a Spanish database, in order to investigate how the risk/confrontation behaviour of 
claimants might influence both the choice of conflict resolution procedure and the compensation 
outcomes achieved by motor injury victims.   
 
The selection of resolution mechanism for legal disputes has been broadly analysed in the 
economic and law literature (see, among others, Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989; Daughety, 2000; 
Sieg, 2000; Shavell, 2004). In the next section we will summarize the work of Cooter and 
Rubinfeld (1989), who define the litigation process as a bargaining model in which the cooperative 
and non-cooperative solutions correspond, respectively, to out-of-court and in-court settlements. 
In order to find a formal solution within the bargaining model, numerous studies assume that both 
parties are risk-neutral (among others, Crocker and Tennyson, 2002; Nalebuff, 1987; P’ng, 1983). 
However, it remains to be established whether the risk-neutral assumption is realistic, and how 
the game theory model might be affected when this assumption is relaxed.  
To this end we investigate whether there are differences in compensation outcomes in Spain 
depending on the conflict resolution procedure followed, and in the event that such differences are 
observed we aim to identify their causes. Three alternative hypotheses are investigated: (i) 
differences in settlements arise because the two resolution mechanisms deal with claims with 
different levels of severity, with seriously injured victims tending towards judicial resolutions; (ii) 
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differences are attributable to the resolution mechanism itself, with one mechanism being more 
generous than the other; and (iii) differences are explained by the behaviour of claimants, with 
those victims who are more averse to risk and confrontation being compensated with lower 
amounts. 
 
Let us briefly consider each of these hypotheses in more detail. Compensation differences 
between out-of-court and in-court settlements may arise because claims dealt with by the courts 
are more severe than those settled by negotiation. This hypothesis is consistent with empirical 
evidence showing that the higher legal costs associated with the judicial procedure act as a 
barrier which makes it unprofitable for litigants with low claims to pursue judicial resolutions 
(Browne and Puelz, 1999; Hughes and Snyder, 1995). Furthermore, claims involving seriously 
injured victims are normally more complex cases, and the literature suggests that greater 
complexity leads to an increased likelihood of litigation (Browne and Schmit, 2008; Shavell, 2004; 
Santolino, 2010). 
 
Another source of compensation differences could be the mechanism itself, such that one of the 
two mechanisms systematically awards greater compensation to claims and claimants with the 
same characteristics. Some studies point out that court settlements are increasingly large, and 
have grown well beyond inflation (de Castries, 2005; Wright, 1987). Actuaries have called this 
effect ‘judicial inflation’, and the Society of Actuaries defines it as the upward tendency of courts in 
interpreting the scope of liability (SOA, 2008). The National Health Service Litigation Authority 
estimates that judicial inflation in clinical negligence claims is now ten per cent per annum in the 
United Kingdom (NHSLA, 2010). One explanation for this is that injury litigation is seen by the 
courts as an unbalanced dispute between bodily injured victims and faceless insurers with an 
unlimited budget, a David versus Goliath scenario. 
 
Finally, and related to the main purpose of this paper, it may be that the attitude of claimants has 
an influence on the size of payouts. An aversion to risk and confrontation can affect a claimant’s 
willingness to reach a friendly settlement, with risk-adverse victims preferring negotiated (and 
more certain) settlements over the uncertainty of a court settlement. Similarly, the psychological 
costs of confrontation, as well as the time required by negotiation, can lead victims with greater 
conflict aversion to opt for friendly agreements reached in shorter negotiations. Preference for 
negotiated settlements is expected to influence negatively on the size of compensation. Indeed, 
previous studies suggest that uncertainty about the amount of financial compensation which might 
be awarded at trial results in risk-adverse individuals accepting lower negotiated settlements in 
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exchange for certainty over payment (Doerpinghaus et al., 2008; Stuhlmacher and Walters, 
1999). 
 
In order to investigate these three hypotheses the present paper applies a switching regression 
model to a Spanish database. A switching model is structured on two regression equations, which 
describe the compensation awarded under each one of the two conflict resolution procedures, 
and a criterion function that determines which conflict resolution procedure is followed. This 
structure allows the comparison of out-of-court and judicial settlements, taking into account the 
influence of observed and unobserved characteristics of motor claims on the settlement level.  
 
Regarding observed characteristics, information related to the severity of injuries is included as 
regressors in the model equations and the selection function. Hence, factors do not need to have 
the same effect on the expected financial compensation of both resolution procedures. Rather, we 
can analyse which factors determine the expected financial compensation awarded to victims 
when the conflict resolution is amicable, and which have explanatory power when the settlement 
is reached by judicial decision.  
 
The regression model with endogenous switching allows for dependence between the choice of 
settlement mechanism and the compensation the individual receives once this mechanism is 
fixed. We can then analyse whether randomness of the settlement procedure for motor victims 
may be assumed. Non-randomness is due to self-selection of individuals, and would occur 
because individuals who decide to reach an agreement with the insurer are systematically 
different from those who choose to go to court. Consequently, unobserved factors that influence 
the decision regarding the conflict resolution procedure also affect the financial compensation 
awarded for injuries.  
 
It is important to note that model endogeneity may be generated by two different types of 
unobserved factors. The first concerns claim information that was not collected but may be 
observed a priori without a large cost. An example in our application would be the amount of 
compensation claimed by the plaintiff for economic losses. The second factor involves claim 
information which is almost never perfectly observed, such as the risk attitude and confrontation 
behaviour of claimants. The empirical results are interpreted by taking into account both these 
sources of endogeneity. 
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As regards the results of the switching regression model, a series of indicators are computed here 
to analyse whether out-of-court settlements show different levels of compensation to those 
awarded by judicial decision. These indicators are constructed as the difference between financial 
compensations estimated under the two different states, negotiation and trial. One resolution 
mechanism will be more generous than the other if the expected value of settlements reached via 
this mechanism is always higher, regardless of the observed and unobserved characteristics of 
claims. Additionally, conditional indicators are computed in order to isolate the effect of 
unobserved characteristics on the expected financial compensation outcomes. These indicators 
are used to discuss how the aversion to risk and confrontation influences on the financial 
compensation payouts. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the theoretical bargaining 
model, while section 3 outlines the switching regression model and the construction of the 
performance indicators for the conflict resolution mechanisms. Section 4 presents the main 
characteristics of the Spanish compensation system, along with a description of the Spanish 
database used in the empirical application. This is followed in section 5 by a discussion and 
interpretation of the results. Concluding remarks are summarized in section 6. 
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2. The game theory model  
 
The game theory model defined by Cooter and Rubinfeld (1989) is followed. In this basic model 
the cooperative and non-cooperative solutions correspond, respectively, to an out-of-court 
settlement and an in-court settlement. Both parties are assumed to have expectations regarding 
trial outcome. The claimant’s subjective expected gain in bringing the suit to trial is Tc-ctc, where 
Tc is the subjective value to the claimant of the possible compensation awarded by court and ctc is 
the cost to the claimant if the case is settled by court. Similarly, the subjective expected loss of the 
defendant (in this case, the insurer) is Ti+cti, where Ti and cti are the subjective value and cost to 
the insurer if the case is tried in court. 
 
The magnitude of Tc depends on the claimant’s estimate of the compensation that will be 
awarded at trial if he/she wins, Ac, as well as on his/her subjective view regarding the probability 
of victory at trial, pc; hence, Tc = f(pc, Ac). Similarly, Ti is defined as a function of the insurer’s 
expectations about the compensation which will be awarded to the claimant at trial and his/her 
subjective view regarding the probability of the claimant’s victory at trial, Ti = f(pi, Ai). For 
purposes of simplification, both court compensation expectations and subjective victory 
probabilities are characterized as scalars. However, they may be defined as vectors, to allow 
partial victories, or as functions of other variables, for instance, based on court costs in order to 
measure parties’ efforts to win.  
re optimistic. 
 
For risk-neutral agents the subjective value of the court outcome is equal to the expected court 
compensation multiplied by the subjective probability of claimant victory, i.e. Tc = pc × Ac and Ti = 
pi × Ai. However, risk aversion generates the following inequalities among agents: Tc < pc × Ac 
and Ti > pi × Ai. The same effect can be derived for agent aversion to confrontation. Pessimism 
also influences an individual’s expectations regarding the trial outcome. When parties are 
relatively pessimistic in this regard the claimant expects to win less than the insurer expects to 
pay, which is expressed as pc×Ac< pi × Ai. The opposite holds when parties a
 
The subjective values of the claimant and the insurer when the claim is settled by negotiation are 
Nc and Ni, while the associated transaction costs are cnc and cni, respectively. In game theory 
terms, the players’ assessment of the value of the game is computed as the difference between 
their subjective values plus the associated costs. When a friendly compensation agreement is 
reached between parties their subjective values are equal, and thus the net transfer between 
them is zero. The cooperative value of the game (CV) is therefore determined by the transaction 
costs incurred by parties in the negotiation, CV = -(cnc+cni). In the non-cooperative game the net 
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transfer is not necessarily equal and, therefore, the non-cooperative value is NCV = (Tc- Ti) - (ctc 
+cti). The difference between the values of these two games determines the surplus of the 
negotiated resolution: 
 S = CV – NCV = (ctc +cti) - (cnc +cni) + (Ti- Tc). 
 
We consider in this model that parties show non-strategic behaviour. The sole interest of both 
parties is to know the amount the defendant will pay to the claimant. Disputes are then settled out 
of court if S takes a positive value, while a negative value means that a judicial settlement is 
preferred. Both risk/confrontation aversion and pessimism of parties regarding court outcomes 
can widen the gap between the parties’ subjective values of trial outcomes, and it is therefore 
more likely that a friendly settlement is reached. Under Spanish motor law all injured victims must 
initiate a legal action in order to be eligible for motor injury compensation no matter what 
resolution procedure is finally followed. Consequently, differences in the associated costs of 
resolution mechanisms are not too large. The surplus of the negotiation resolution is then mainly 
determined by the subjective values of trial outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis related to the behavioural features of parties 
 
We hypothesize that insurers have a systematic disputing behaviour that is based exclusively on 
their accurate expectation of the compensation payment which might be awarded at trial. It is 
presumed that courts systematically apply the same criteria to resolve disputes, these court 
criteria being defined by Priest and Klein (1984) as ‘the decision standard’. However, insurer and 
claimant do not have the same information about possible trial outcomes, and we assume that the 
insurer has superior information in this regard. Indeed, insurance firms deal with legal disputes as 
part of their daily routine, and they typically call on experts from different disciplines (lawyers, 
medical experts, actuaries, etc.) to take part in legal proceedings. We therefore consider that this 
multidisciplinary team has better knowledge about how the legal system is likely to be interpreted 
- and applied - by judges. Obviously, knowledge about how a court (or judge) may behave on 
average does not eliminate uncertainty about the amount of compensation that this court (or 
judge) will award in a particular case. As regards insurer behaviour, we assume that the insurer 
seeks to settle the claim at the minimum cost, regardless of the time of payment and the 
resolution procedure followed. Therefore, the insurer will prefer the resolution procedure 
associated with the lower expected compensation. This means that the insurer shows neither risk 
aversion nor confrontation aversion behaviour (Grochulski and Kareken, 2004; Santolino, 2010).  
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As already implied above, the decision to pursue a judicial resolution or to reach an agreement 
will mainly depend on the claimant. We consider throughout this paper that the judicial process 
and the negotiation process are separated. Although this does not have implications for our 
modelling, in practice the court verdict is observed when the negotiation process fails. The 
negotiation process consists of a round of bids/demands before an agreement is reached, but if 
such agreement proves impossible then the claim is resolved by judicial decision (Ayuso and 
Santolino, 2011). The strategy followed by the risk-neutral insurer in the negotiation process 
would be to make relatively low initial bids to the victim. If these bids are rejected by the victim, 
the insurer would then progressively increase the amount of compensation offered in subsequent 
bids. The number of rounds before accepting the bid will depend on how risk and confrontation 
adverse or pessimistic the claimant is. The size of the maximum bid that the insurer is willing to 
pay will be based on his accurate expectation of the compensation payment which might be 
awarded at trial. In the event that the victim rejects this maximum bid, then the claim is settled by 
judicial decision. The judicial resolution is then pursued for those claimants with higher 
risk/confrontation preference and who are more optimistic regarding the compensation outcome at 
trial. 
 
It is important to note that the analysis relies on a number of simplifying assumptions. We define 
the claimant as the victim and the insurer as the defendant, both of whom are usually represented 
by a lawyer. Furthermore, the defendant is the insured driver, even though he or she is covered 
by the insurance company. We therefore ignore incentive problems between the lawyer and the 
represented party, and between the insurer and the insured. The former are due to the moral 
hazard resulting from the superior information which the lawyer has compared to the claimant 
(Hay, 1996). The latter are especially important when the insurance policy has coverage limits 
(Sykes, 1994). The rules regarding the cost allocation of fees, where each party bears its own 
costs or where losers at trial pay the winner’s legal fees, also have effects on the litigation 
decision (Hughes and Snyder, 1995). An excellent review of these and other extensions of the 
basic model can be found in Shavell (2004). 
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3. Statistical methodology  
 
Selection models can be used to model compensation payments when the selection of the 
resolution mechanism by parties is not random. In this section, we introduce an endogenous 
switching regression model to account for selection correction. The regression model with 
endogenous switching allows for dependence between the choice of the resolution mechanism 
and the compensation outcome. In subsequent sections this model will be used to examine how 
characteristics related to both the victim and the accident may affect decisions regarding the 
choice between trial and negotiation, as well as the compensation received in both cases.  
 
Based on the general framework described in Maddala (1983) and Lokshin and Sajaia (2004), let 
us consider the following model which describes the selection of the conflict resolution 
mechanism and the compensation awarded to the victim under the mechanism followed: 
 
1iI  (the i-th claim is settled by judicial decision) if 0i iz u     
0iI  (the i-th claim is settled by negotiation) if 0i iz u     
1 1 1i iy x 1i    if 1iI   
0 0 0i iy x 0i    if . 0iI
 
In this model, y1i and y0i are the dependent variables that indicate the compensation to the i-th 
victim under the trial and the negotiation procedures, respectively.  , β1 and β0 are vectors of 
parameters subject to estimation. zi is a vector of characteristics that influence on the selection of 
the conflict resolution procedure; x1i and x0i are two vectors of characteristics that affect victims’ 
compensation under each resolution mechanism. To facilitate the interpretation of results, we 
include the same regressors in both the trial and negotiation equations. The notation may be then 
simplified as 1 0i i ix x x  . Finally, ui, ε1i, and ε0i are three random error terms that follow a 
trivariate normal distribution with mean vector zero and the covariance matrix 
 
2
1 0
2
1 1
2
0 0
u u u
u
u
  
 
 
      
 
where 2 u  is the variance of the error term in the selection equation, and 21  and 20  are the 
variances of the error terms in the continuous equations. 1u  and 0u  are the covariances of ui 
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and ε1i and ε0i, respectively. Finally, the covariance of ε1i and ε0i is not defined, as y1i and y0i are 
never observed simultaneously.  
 
After parameter estimation the following conditional and unconditional expectations can be 
calculated: 
   
  
     
      
      
      
1 1
0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0
| 1
| 2
| 1, / 3
| 1, / 4
| 0, / 1 5
| 0, / 1 6
i i i
i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E y x x
E y x x
E y I x x f Z F Z
E y I x x f Z F Z
E y I x x f Z F Z
E y I x x f Z F Z


    
    
    
    


  
  
     
     

 



1
 
where 1 1 /    u u  is the correlation coefficient between ui and ε1i and 0 0 / 0    u u  is the 
correlation coefficient between ui and ε0i, We assume that 2 1u  . Then,  f  is the standard normal 
density distribution function and F is the standard cumulative normal distribution function. 
 
Based on equations (1) to (6), three indicators can be introduced to compare the victims’ 
compensation payment when they decide to go to court with that obtained when they decide to 
negotiate with the insurance company, 
    
   
   
   
1 1 0
2 1 0
3 1 0
| |
| 1, | 1, 7
| 0, | 0,
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E y x E y x
E y I x E y I x
E y I x E y I x



 
   
   
 
where 1  is equal to the expected compensation of the i-th victim under trial minus his/her 
expected compensation under negotiation (irrespective of his/her choice of conflict resolution 
procedure). The mean of 1  would measure the average profitability of victims when claims are 
settled by judicial decision. From an insurance company point of view, it would measure its 
average profitability from negotiating. When the analysis is restricted to the trial sample or the 
negotiation sample, we therefore obtain 2  and 3 , respectively. 
 
Two additional indicators are computed to compare the level of compensation from different 
samples, 
   
   
1 1 1
2 0 0
| 1, | 0,
| 1, | 0, 8
i i i i i i
i i i i i i
E y I x E y I x
E y I x E y I x


   
       
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1  compares the expected compensation of the i-th victim in trial given the litigants pursued a 
judicial resolution with the expected compensation in trial whether litigants went to negotiation. A 
positive mean of 1  indicates that under the judicial procedure, victims who actually went to court 
tended to receive larger compensation than those who did not. For 2  a similar deduction can be 
obtained for the negotiation case. 
 
Finally, four indicators are constructed to measure the effect of victims’ selection correction, 
   
   
   
   
1 1 1
2 0 0
3 1 1
4 0 0
| 1, |
| 0, |
| 0, | 9
| 1, |
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i
E y I x E y x
E y I x E y x
E y I x E y x
E y I x E y x




  
  
  
  
   
 
where 1  compares the compensation of the sample trial victim under the trial choice with the 
expected compensation of a general victim with the same characteristics and also under the trial 
choice. A positive mean of 1  indicates that under the trial procedure, victims who actually went to 
court tended to receive greater compensation than did a general victim. The same conclusions 
can be obtained for 2  in the negotiation case. 3  compares the compensation of a sample 
negotiation victim under the trial choice with the expected compensation of a general victim under 
the trial choice. A positive mean of 3  indicates that under the trial procedure, victims who did not 
go to court tended to receive greater compensation than did a general victim. The same 
conclusions can be obtained for 4  in the negotiation case.  
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4. Empirical analysis: data 
 
Motor compensations awarded for personal damages in Spain have to be assessed in compliance 
with a legislative compensation system. In fact, scheduled systems are used in most European 
countries to guide the assessment of compensation for bodily injuries resulting from traffic 
collisions. The aim of these systems is to reduce uncertainty over the amount of awards and, 
consequently, to avoid litigation (Rogers, 2001; Rothley, 2003). The Spanish compensation 
system is relatively straightforward. A basic compensation is stipulated for non-economic 
damages, such as pain and suffering, and correction factors are then applied to account for 
economic damages. Victims are entitled to receive a basic compensation for temporary disability 
and another for permanent disability. The amount of basic compensation depends on the duration 
and severity of injuries. Economic correction factors are based on the victim’s annual income. 
Claimants may request either financial compensation for the damages sustained, filing a tort suit, 
or the additional punishment of the criminal offence committed by the driver, in which case a 
criminal suit is required. Criminal proceedings are the common procedure. Santolino (2010) 
showed that fewer than 15% of suits followed a tort procedure.  
 
For the present analysis data were provided by one of the largest insurance companies operating 
in Spain. The database consists of a random sample of 24,938 non-fatal victims involved in traffic 
collisions in Spain, of which 23,816 claims were settled by a friendly agreement between the 
insurer and the claimant and 1,122 were settled by judicial decision. All sample victims were 
compensated in the year 2007. The mean compensation awarded in claims settled by judicial 
decision was 18,385.34 Euros, with a standard deviation of 27,657.83 Euros. For negotiated 
settlements the mean compensation and standard deviation were 10,302.12 Euros and 22,168.91 
Euros, respectively. Therefore, negotiated settlements show a greater relative dispersion, with a 
Pearson variation coefficient of 1.504 and 2.154, respectively.  
 
The information included in the database was recorded by the insurer during the processing of 
claims in order to track them until settlement. The description of variables is shown in Table 1. 
Explanatory variables are classified as general factors or factors related to information about 
injuries. General factors include attributes of the victim, such as gender and age. In this regard, it 
is worth noting that previous studies have found differences in risk aversion and negotiation 
preference that affect settlements as a function of age and gender (Doerpinghaus et al., 2008; 
Stuhlmacher and Walters, 1999; Garbarino et al., 2011).  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1] 
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The remaining general factors record information related to the type of victim (driver, passenger, 
and pedestrian or cyclist) and information about the insured driver, such as his/her age. The road 
safety literature shows that the victim’s position and the age of the at-fault driver influence the 
severity of injuries (Newgard, 2008; Boucher and Santolino, 2010). These two factors may also 
explain the victim’s attitude to conflict resolution (Derrig and Weisberg, 2004; Doerpinghaus et al., 
2003). The negotiation strategy depends on the relationship between agents and the conflict 
behaviour of the opposing party. Derrig and Weisberg (2004) suggested that passengers obtain 
lower settlements than do non-passengers due to the familiarity effect. Consistent with the 
hypothesis of different conflict behaviour in the insured driver, Doerpinghaus et al. (2003) found 
fault assessment differences as a function of the driver’s age. 
 
Injury factors provide a description of injuries resulting from the accident, such as the nature of 
injuries, their severity, evolution and the body region that was injured. The injury information 
recorded is based on medical assessments carried out by the insurer during the period in which 
victims are recovering from their injuries. The final medical assessment is made when the victim is 
fully recovered or with stable injuries. There are three variables related to the period during which 
the victim is temporarily disabled; time in hospital, time out-of-hospital with inability to work, and 
time out-of-hospital without inability to work. Under the Spanish system these three types of 
temporary disability entitle the victim to a daily basic compensation. The period ‘out-of hospital 
with inability to work’ refers to the out-of-hospital recovery period during which the victim is on sick 
leave. The period ‘out-of hospital without inability to work’ relates to the out-of-hospital recovery 
period during which the victim is able to work but requires some form of therapy. 
 
The next two factors relate to permanent disability and aesthetic damage. Basic compensation for 
permanent disability depends on an injury score that ranges between 0 and 100 (from minimum to 
maximum severity). The score is derived from a medical scale that describes 475 injuries and 
provides severity scores for each one. Up to 50 points may be additionally awarded if the victim 
suffered aesthetic damage (for more details, see Boucher and Santolino, 2010). A further four 
variables indicate whether variation occurred between the initial and final medical assessments as 
regards the temporary disability duration and the permanent disability severity. Variations across 
medical assessments may influence the settlement expectations of claimants and, consequently, 
their behaviour as regards conflict resolution. 
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In addition to the injury’s duration and severity, other characteristics may also affect settlements. 
For instance, some types of injuries are associated with greater suspicion of fraud (Crocker and 
Tennyson, 2002; Derrig and Weisberg, 2004), while economic damages may vary in function of 
the injury type. Furthermore, information about the influence of injury type on settlements may 
have implications for the economic analysis of road safety policies. Injuries described in the 
legislative scale are classified according to their nature and the body location in order to reduce 
the number of injuries to a manageable number of diagnostic categories, this approach being 
inspired by the Barell diagnostic matrix (Barell et al., 2002). There are six factors that relate to the 
body location and seven to the nature of the injury. Victims may suffer more than one injury and, 
therefore, these factors are not mutually exclusive.  
 
Note that most of the observed characteristics are related to the nature and severity of the 
injuries, whereas information about financial losses incurred by claimants as a consequence of 
the accident is not observed in this study. According to the Spanish legislative compensation 
system, economic damages such as the compensation for loss of earnings are upper-limited, 
especially for those projected to the future. As a general rule, the amount is stipulated as a 
percentage of the compensation awarded for non-economic losses, which increases with annual 
incomes, whereas non-economic losses depend strictly on injury severity (Santolino, 2010). 
Consequently, economic damages are partially captured by those factors related to the type and 
severity of injuries. 
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5. Empirical analysis: results 
 
The switching regression model was fitted to the data. Parameters were estimated by maximum 
likelihood by means of the QLIM procedure implemented in SAS. Regressors that did not show 
significant coefficients were removed from equations, while the same covariates are used in both 
compensation regressions. The results for the selection equation of the conflict resolution 
procedure are reported in Table 2. The results of the compensation regressions in the trial and 
negotiation procedures are reported in Table 3. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2] 
 
It should first be noted that two factors from Table 1, 1x  (Gender) and 25x  (Superficial), were 
dropped from the final regressions due to the lack of significance for parameters in all the 
equations of the switching regression model. Other studies suggest that higher risk/confrontation 
aversion among women, coupled with gender discrimination, result in women receiving lower 
amounts of compensation than men (Doerpinghaus et al., 2008).  
Two different groups of variables are included in the selection regression. The first comprises 
general factors, including attributes of the victim and the insured driver: victim and at-fault driver 
ages (and their squared value) and type of victim (driver, passenger, and pedestrian or cyclist). 
The second consists of injury variables such as the nature of injuries, their severity, evolution and 
the body region that was injured: disabled days, severity score, aesthetic damage, hospital days 
variation, non-disabled days variation, head, upper torso, sprain/strain and muscle. 
 
In addition to the variables included in the selection regression the compensation equations 
include other injury factors: hospital days, non-disabled days, disabled days variation, severity 
score variation, lower torso, upper extremities, lower extremities, multiple regions, fracture, 
unconsciousness, abrasion and internal injury. The hypothesis of joint independence of the three 
equations is rejected (the likelihood-ratio test for joint independence is reported in the Table 3 
where LR test = 25.02 and p = 0.000). The following subsections discuss different aspects of the 
results obtained after estimation of the switching regression model. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3] 
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5.1. Endogeneity assumption between conflict resolution procedure and compensation 
payouts 
 
The correlation coefficients 0  (correlation between the conflict resolution procedure selection 
equation and the negotiation compensation equation) and 1  (correlation between the conflict 
resolution procedure selection equation and the trial compensation equation) are both significantly 
different from zero (see Table 3). This shows that the endogeneity assumption is realistic for 
these data, and therefore the use of an endogenous switching regression model is appropriate to 
account for the unobservable selection bias in deciding whether to go to court or negotiate with 
the insurance company.  
 
It should be remembered that the regression model with endogenous switching assumes that the 
choice of settlement mechanism is not independent of the compensation the individual receives 
once the settlement mechanism is fixed, and that non-randomness is due to self-selection of 
individuals. In this case, non-randomness occurs because individuals who decide to reach an 
agreement with the insurer are systematically different from those who go to court. Hence, 
unobserved factors that influence the decision regarding the conflict resolution procedure also 
affect the financial compensation awarded for injuries.  
 
Since 0  is positive the model suggests that victims who choose negotiation to resolve the 
conflict receive lower compensation in the negotiation than a random individual from the sample 
would have received (eq. 6). Likewise, since 1  is negative the model suggests that victims who 
choose negotiation receive higher compensation in trial than a random individual from the sample 
would have received (eq. 5). With the help of the indicators defined in section 3, these last 
assertions will be discussed in more detail in subsection 5.3, where we also discuss which source 
of endogeneity, or unobserved factors, are more consistent in our case. Before doing so, the 
following subsection considers the estimation results for the selection function and the 
compensation functions.  
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5.2. Coefficient estimates of the selection and compensation functions 
 
Coefficient estimates for the selection function are shown in Table 2, from which the following 
conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, driver victims of middle age who are involved in an accident 
caused by young or elder drivers of the other vehicle are more likely to go to court. Secondly, the 
injury factors indicate that victims who are more seriously injured (with more disabled days or 
higher severity score) are more likely to go to court. Thirdly, victims for whom the number of 
hospital recovery days stated in the first medical examination is larger than in the last one, as well 
as victims with head injuries, are both more likely to go to court. However, victims are less likely to 
go to court if the insurance company recognizes they suffered aesthetic damage. 
 
The estimation results for the compensation functions according to the type of conflict resolution 
procedure are reported in Table 3. When the compensation payout is the result of a negotiation 
procedure the following results are obtained. Pedestrian and cyclist victims of middle age are 
more likely to obtain a higher compensation. However, the age of the at-fault driver is not 
significant in this case. As was expected, victims with more hospital, disabled and non-disabled 
days and a higher severity score are more likely to obtain a higher compensation. Similarly, 
victims for whom the number of hospital recovery days or severity score stated in the first medical 
examination is larger than in the last one are more likely to obtain a higher compensation. By 
contrast, victims for whom the number of disabled or non-disabled days stated in the first medical 
examination is larger than in the last one, as well as victims with injuries to multiple regions or 
abrasion injuries, are more likely to obtain a lower compensation.  
 
When the compensation is the result of a trial procedure the following results are obtained. 
Passengers in the at-fault vehicle, pedestrian and cyclist victims, and victims from an accident 
caused by a middle-aged driver are more likely to obtain a higher compensation. However, the 
victim’s age is not significant in this case. Regarding injury factors, victims with more disabled and 
non-disabled days and a higher severity score are more likely to obtain a higher compensation. 
Hospital days are not significant here. Victims with injuries in the upper or lower torso, 
sprain/strain or muscle injuries, and victims with aesthetic damage are all more likely to obtain a 
higher compensation. 
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5.3. Level of compensation after sample selection correction 
 
In this subsection, and with the help of indicators (7) to (9), we analyse the variations in the 
estimates of the mean compensation payouts after sample selection correction. Table 4 shows 
the mean and standard deviation of these indicators for our data set.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4] 
 
Alpha indicators 
 
The first group of indicators ( 1 , 2 and 3 ) helps to compare victims’ expected compensation 
payouts under the trial and negotiation conditions, regardless of the resolution mechanism that is 
eventually followed by litigants. The fact that they all have a positive value means that in all cases 
court settlements produce, on average, larger compensation payouts than do friendly agreements 
with the insurance company. These estimates take into account the endogeneity caused by the 
choice of procedure. The first conclusion to be drawn is therefore that in-court settlements are 
expected to be larger than out-court settlements, regardless of the characteristics of the claim and 
claimant. Thus, it can be stated that the judicial resolution mechanism is more generous than the 
one based on negotiation. 
  
As previously indicated, we assume that insurers are well-informed about the behaviour of courts, 
and they can therefore make a reasonably good estimate of the compensation that might be 
awarded by court. Consistent with our hypothesis that insurers have a systematic disputing 
behaviour based on their deep knowledge of court performance, the results of the alpha indicators 
show that negotiated compensation does not, on average, exceed judicial compensation. We 
therefore conclude that maximum compensations offered by insurers in negotiation are lower than 
the amounts awarded by courts.  
 
The values of alpha indicators provide some insight into the type of unobserved characteristics 
that influence the choice of conflict resolution procedure and the compensation payout. In addition 
to accurate estimates of judicial compensations, we assume that insurers are risk-confrontation 
neutral. Risk and confrontation neutrality imply that insurers do not have a particular preference 
as regards the resolution procedure. Therefore, the maximum offer that insurers are willing to pay 
in the negotiation should be approximately their expectation of the compensation payment which 
might be awarded at trial. Insurers would offer then higher compensation amounts to victims with 
lower risk aversion and a stronger preference for confrontation. Even if the victim is overly 
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optimistic without due basis regarding the compensation that might be awarded by a court, 
insurers who reach a friendly agreement with this victim would offer higher compensation than 
they would to a victim with the same damages but who is less optimistic about his/her chances. 
Interpreting the negotiation process as a succession of bids/demands, these victims would need 
more rounds before accepting the bid.  
 
The alpha values support the assumption of risk/confrontation neutrality and accurate estimates of 
judicial outcomes of insurers, and risk/confrontation aversion of claimants. The mean of 1  
measures the victim’s average profitability from going to court, irrespective of his/her choice of 
conflict resolution procedure but taking into account general and injury factors of the claimant. 
Remember that compensations are considered on a natural log scale. When we take into account 
the victim’s choice of conflict resolution procedure, and after correcting for selection bias, we 
observe that the victim’s average profitability from going to court is much less for the trial sample 
( 2 ) than for the negotiation sample ( 3 ). The large value of 3  may be explained by the high 
level of risk and confrontation aversion of those sample victims who were compensated through 
negotiation. On average, judges would have awarded them drastically higher compensation than 
was agreed in friendly negotiation. By contrast, victims compensated by courts would have 
obtained only a slightly lower compensation in negotiation, as indicated by the value of 2 . 
Victims who seek a judicial resolution are less risk/confrontation adverse2 and more optimistic 
about their chances in court than victims who decide to negotiate. And insurers are 
risk/confrontation neutral and make accurate estimates of trial outcomes. That means, during 
negotiation insurers would be willing to offer these victims a compensation payment close to the 
compensation finally awarded in trial. 
 
Lambda indicators 
 
The previous interpretation relies on the hypothesis that the source of unobserved claim 
characteristics that influences the compensation payout is related to the attitude of claimants 
regarding risk aversion, their confrontation preference and how optimistic they are. It is important 
to note that model endogeneity may be generated by other type of unobserved factors. There are 
claim characteristics that affect the final payout and they were not collected, but may be observed 
a priori without a large cost. For instance, although economic damages are partially captured by 
                                                 
2  In Spain, the confrontation preference of victims who pursue a judicial resolution may be an important issue. As 
previously mentioned, most suits follow the criminal procedure and, therefore, injured victims with a stronger preference 
for a judicial resolution may seek not only financial compensation but also punishment of the criminal offence committed 
by the driver. 
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injury factors, information related to the financial losses incurred by claimants as a consequence 
of the accident is unobserved in our study. Different levels of compensation associated to each 
resolution route could be then because victims who settled by judicial decision sustained different 
economic damages, on average, than did victims who settled by negotiation. The lambda 
indicators are consistent with this hypothesis. In particular, lambda results suggest that the both 
sources of endogeneity act on opposite direction over the expected compensation payout.  
 
The negative sign of 1  indicates that victims who settled through negotiation are associated with 
a higher expected compensation payout by court than was actually obtained by those who were 
compensated by judicial decision. This result may be explained by taking into account the two 
sources of endogeneity. Firstly, victims who settle by negotiation show higher risk and conflict 
aversion in disputes, but these attitudinal characteristics play a minor role in the in-court 
assessment. Therefore, judges would award them higher compensation than was obtained 
through the negotiation procedure. However, this interpretation is not sufficient to explain why 
these victims have larger expected compensations than do those who settled by judicial decision. 
We hypothesize that victims who settled by judicial decision sustained, on average, lower 
recoverable economic damages. Following the same reasoning of risk and confrontation neutrality 
and deeper knowledge of court behaviour, the insurance company accurately estimates the 
compensation payouts that might be awarded by courts for economic damages and includes them 
in the compensation bids made in the negotiation process. Therefore, victims who go to court are 
more likely to claim damages that are either legally not recoverable or not properly proven, or 
simply did not exist. 
 
On the other hand, the positive 2  indicates that victims who went to court would have obtained a 
higher compensation in negotiation than did those who actually reached a friendly agreement. 
This result is mainly explained because victims who go to court have a lower level of 
risk/confrontation aversion. They would obtain higher compensation in negotiation than would 
victims who prefer friendly agreements reached in shorter negotiations because they are most 
likely only willing to accept larger bids through the negotiation. To be consistent with the previous 
arguments made regarding 1 , the positive sign of 2  indicates that in the negotiation process the 
effect of risk/confrontation aversion is higher than the level of recoverable economic damages 
sustained. Victims who settled by judicial decision are optimistic regarding their chances at trial, 
and this optimism influences the possibility of reaching an agreement with the insurer for a higher 
amount of compensation. If a trial finally takes place, however, these victims could receive 
relatively lower compensation amounts for the recoverable economic damages. 
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To conclude, the lambda indicators strengthen the supposition that the attitude of litigants is the 
main source of unobserved characteristics that explains compensation differences between 
resolution mechanisms. By contrast, unobserved characteristics related to recoverable economic 
damages would reduce these differences. 
 
 
Delta indicators 
 
Finally, we compute delta indicators to measure the selection bias correction in relation to the 
victim’s average compensation. As already mentioned, the same covariates are used in both 
compensation functions to facilitate the interpretation of indicators. Therefore, the delta indicators 
coincide with the average of the selection correction terms of equations (3) to (6). 1  and 3  refer 
to the selection bias corrections for compensation under the trial procedure, while 2  and 4  
correct the compensation under the negotiation procedure. 1  is the correction for the level of 
compensation under the trial procedure given the characteristics of each victim, , and 
when the victim decides to go to court,
 1 |iE y ix
 1 | 1,i i iE y I x . 3  is the correction for the level of 
compensation under the trial procedure given the characteristics of each victim,  1 |i iE y x , and 
when the victim decides to negotiate,  1 | 0,i i iI xE y . Similar interpretation holds for 2  and 4  
under the negotiation procedure. This group of indicators can also be used to decompose the 1  
and 2  indicators, since 1 1 3     and 2 4 2    . 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
Game models define the cooperative solution as the out-of-court settlement and the non-
cooperative solution as the in-court settlement. The cooperative value of the game mainly 
depends on negotiation costs. In the non-cooperative game this value is the difference between 
the subjective values of litigants when settling the claim by trial minus the transaction costs 
incurred by the parties in court. Disputes are settled by negotiation when the difference between 
these two game values is positive, while a trial court settlement is preferred if the value is 
negative. Theoretical bargaining models often assume that parties are risk-neutral in order to find 
a formal solution to the game. However, the results of this empirical analysis with Spanish motor 
data lead us to conclude that the assumption of risk-neutral behaviour is barely fulfilled by 
claimants.  
 
The analysis demonstrates that larger amounts of compensation are always awarded by judicial 
decision than by negotiation, regardless of the type of claims. However, most motor claims are 
settled by negotiation. We argue that claims are settled by negotiation because claimants are 
either risk/confrontation adverse or pessimistic about their chances at trial, or a combination of 
both. Risk/confrontation aversion and pessimism regarding court outcomes increase the gap 
between the subjective value of the trial outcome as perceived by claimants and by insurers. 
Consequently, the probability of the parties reaching a friendly settlement also increases.  
 
Unlike in the case of claimants, the risk and confrontation neutrality of insurers is consistent with 
our results. The greater expertise of insurers makes them more objective than victims regarding 
the compensation payouts that might be awarded by courts. Insurers would start the negotiation 
process with relatively low initial compensation bids, and would increase these progressively as 
victims reject these offers. The judicial resolution route is only preferred by insurers when victims 
do not accept a maximum compensation offer that is close to the expected in-court compensation. 
Therefore, the point at which the negotiation process is successfully (or unsuccessfully) stopped 
will depend on how risk/confrontation adverse the victim is, and how optimistic he/she is regarding 
the compensation payout that might be awarded by court. As a consequence, risk and 
confrontation adverse victims obtain relatively lower amounts of compensation. By contrast, 
victims who are overly optimistic or who have a clear confrontation preference will eventually go to 
court, and in those cases the compensation awarded by courts will be lower than that for a 
random individual.  
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These results may have policy implications in terms of the characteristics that a motor 
compensation system should fulfil. In traditional motor compensation systems the settlement is 
the result of a negotiation between parties. In case that the negotiation fails, then the 
compensation is awarded by judicial decision. However, we argue here that these systems could 
be favouring the characteristics of one of the involved parties. We demonstrate that the higher 
expertise of insurers enables them to have an advantageous position in the negotiation process, 
where more than 95% of claims are settled. The incorporation of elements of arbitrage in the 
negotiation stage may be useful to balance the position of parties in the dispute. In this regard, 
motor compensation systems in which an objective assessment of possible compensation is 
provided to both parties without increasing the courts’ workload may be desirable. Examples such 
as the Irish system, which incorporates a non-partial intermediary agency that provides an 
objective assessment of motor compensation during the negotiation process, could be an 
interesting alternative. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table 1. Description of variables and some statistics 
 
Variable      Label Description Mean Std.Dev. 
Dependent variables  
I 
Resolution 
procedure 
1 if the compensation is awarded by judicial decision; 0 if 
the compensation is agreed by negotiation.  
0.045 0.207 
y0 
Negotiated 
compensation 
Victim compensation agreed between parties (on natural 
log scale). 
8.666 0.759 
y1 Trial compensation 
Victim compensation awarded by court (on natural log 
scale). 
9.145 0.891 
General regressors  
x1 Gender 1 if the victim is a male; 0 otherwise. 0.221 0.415 
x2 Victim’s age Age of the victim (divided by 100). 0.378 0.168 
x3 
Victim’s age
squared 
Victim’s age squared (divided by 10000). 0.171 0.150 
x4 
At-fault  
driver’s age 
Age of the at-fault driver (divided by 100). 0.405 0.146 
x5 
At-fault driver’s age
squared 
At-fault driver’s age squared (divided by 10000). 0.185 0.131 
x6 Driver 1 if the injured party was the driver; 0 otherwise. 0.505 0.500 
x7 
Passenger in no-
fault vehicle 
1 if the injured party was a passenger in the no-fault 
vehicle; 0 otherwise. 
0.219 0.413 
x8 
Passenger in at-
fault vehicle  
1 if the injured party was a passenger in the at-fault 
vehicle; 0 otherwise. 
0.154 0.361 
x9 Pedestrian/Cyclist 
1 if the injured party was either a pedestrian or a cyclist; 0 
otherwise. 
0.122 0.328 
Regressors related to injury information recorded by the insurer 
x10 Hospital days Number of recovery days in hospital.  0.002 0.010 
x11 Disabled days 
Number of out-of-hospital recovery days with inability to 
work. 
0.076 0.076 
x12 Non-disabled days 
Number of out-of-hospital recovery days without inability to 
work.  
0.027 0.039 
x13 Severity score Assessment of injury severity (in points). 0.042 0.073 
x14 Aesthetic damage 1 if the victim suffers aesthetic damage; 0 otherwise. 0.222 0.415 
x15 
Hospital days
variation 
1 if the number of hospital recovery days stated in the last 
medical examination is lower than in the first one; 0 
otherwise. 
0.024 0.153 
x16 
Disabled days
variation 
1 if the number of out-of-hospital recovery days with 
inability to work stated in the last medical examination is 
lower than in the first one; 0 otherwise. 
0.352 0.478 
x17 
Non-disabled days
variation 
1 if the number of out-of-hospital recovery days without 
inability to work stated in the last medical examination is 
lower than in the first one; 0 otherwise. 
0.280 0.449 
x18 
Severity score
variation 
1 if the assessment of injury severity stated in the last 
medical examination is lower than in the first one; 0 
otherwise. 
0.253 0.435 
x19 Head 1 if injury located in head; 0 otherwise. 0.131 0.337 
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x20 Upper torso  
1 if injury located in upper torso (thorax/dorsal); 0 
otherwise. 
0.243 0.429 
x21 Lower torso  
1 if injury located in lower torso (abdomen/lumbar); 0 
otherwise. 
0.188 0.391 
x22 Upper extremities 1 if injury located in upper extremities; 0 otherwise. 0.260 0.439 
x23 Lower extremities 1 if injury located in lower extremities; 0 otherwise. 0.247 0.431 
x24 Multiple regions 1 if contusions in multiple body regions; 0 otherwise. 0.054 0.227 
x25 Superficial 
1 if superficial injury (e.g. contusions or wounds); 0 
otherwise. 
0.569 0.495 
x26 Fracture 1 if fracture; 0 otherwise. 0.179 0.383 
x27 Unconsciousness 1 if unconsciousness after the accident; 0 otherwise. 0.024 0.154 
x28 Sprain/strain 1 if sprain/strain; 0 otherwise. 0.724 0.447 
x29 Muscle 
1 if a muscle injury other than a sprain or strain; 0 
otherwise. 
0.026 0.160 
x30 Abrasion 1 if abrasion/ burn; 0 otherwise. 0.064 0.245 
x31 Internal injury 
1 if internal injury (nerves, blood vessels, etc.); 0 
otherwise. 
0.014 0.119 
 
 
Table 2. Parameter estimates and standard errors of the resolution procedure selection function 
 
Variable Label Coeff. Estim. Std. Error 
 Intercept -1.455 0.135*** 
x2 Victim’s age γ2 0.647 0.432 
x3 Victim’s age squared γ3 -0.820 0.493* 
x4 At-fault driver’s age γ4 -1.158 0.500** 
x5 At-fault driver’s age squared γ5 1.209 0.556** 
x7 Passenger in no-fault vehicle(*) γ7 -0.087 0.036** 
x8 Passenger in at-fault vehicle(*)  γ8 -0.447 0.051*** 
x9 Pedestrian/Cyclist(*) γ9 -0.235 0.053*** 
x11 Disabled days γ11 1.032 0.218*** 
x13 Severity score γ16 1.094 0.205*** 
x14 Aesthetic damage γ17 -0.152 0.043*** 
x15 Hospital days variation γ13 0.321 0.053*** 
x17 Non-disabled days variation γ15 -0.125 0.033*** 
x19 Head γ19 0.183 0.041*** 
x20 Upper torso  γ20 -0.121 0.035*** 
x28 Sprain/strain γ28 -0.104 0.037*** 
x29 Muscle γ29 -0.239 0.065*** 
N = 24,938.  
(*) Base category is driver, x6. 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *10% significance level. 
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Table 3. Parameter estimates and standard errors of the financial compensation regression equations 
 
  Negotiated compensation Trial compensation 
Variable Label Coeff. Estim. Std. Error Coeff. Estim. Std. Error 
 Intercept β0,0 7.771 0.023*** β1,0 9.054 0.190*** 
x2 Victim’s age β0,2 0.581 0.070*** β1,2 0.805 0.487* 
x3 Victim’s age squared β0,3 -0.704 0.079*** β1,3 -0.958 0.562* 
x4 
At-fault  
driver’s age 
β0,4 0.137 0.086 β1,4 1.063 0.539** 
x5 
At-fault driver’s age 
squared 
 β0,5 -0.157 0.096*  β1,5 -1.181 0.597** 
x7 
Passenger in no-fault 
vehicle(*) 
 β0,7 -0.014 0.006**  β1,7 0.064 0.040 
x8 
Passenger in at-fault 
vehicle(*)  
 β0,8 -0.021 0.007***  β1,8 0.374 0.064*** 
x9 Pedestrian/Cyclist(*)  β0,9 0.040 0.009***  β1,9 0.135 0.063** 
x10 Hospital days  β0,10 1.334 0.299***  β1,10 -0.284 0.962 
x11 Disabled days  β0,11 5.610 0.044***  β1,11 4.248 0.236*** 
x12 Non-disabled days  β0,12 3.202 0.064***  β1,12 2.426 0.343*** 
x13 Severity score  β0,13 3.840 0.052***  β1,13 3.686 0.253*** 
x14 Aesthetic damage  β0,14 0.031 0.007***  β1,14 0.202 0.049*** 
x15 Hospital days variation  β0,15 0.117 0.016***  β1,15 -0.174 0.078** 
x16 Disabled days variation  β0,16 -0.032 0.005***  β1,16 0.038 0.032 
x17 
Non-disabled days 
variation 
 β0,17 -0.036 0.005***  β1,17 0.065 0.039* 
x18 Severity score variation  β0,18 0.016 0.006***  β1,18 0.027 0.035 
x19 Head β0,19 0.045 0.008*** β1,19 -0.088 0.048* 
x20 Upper torso  β0,20 0.018 0.006*** β1,20 0.101 0.041** 
x21 Lower torso  β0,21 0.063 0.006*** β1,21 0.068 0.038* 
x22 Upper extremities β0,22 0.032 0.006*** β1,22 0.003 0.034 
x23 Lower extremities β0,23 0.023 0.006*** β1,23 0.035 0.037 
x24 Multiple regions β0,24 -0.041 0.011*** β1,24 -0.090 0.072 
x26 Fracture β0,26 0.155 0.008*** β1,26 0.057 0.043 
x27 Unconsciousness β0,27 0.014 0.017 β1,27 0.186 0.086** 
x28 Sprain/strain β0,28 0.067 0.007*** β1,28 0.101 0.041** 
x29 Muscle β0,29 0.080 0.010*** β1,29 0.177 0.078** 
x30 Abrasion β0,30 -0.092 0.015*** β1,30 0.018 0.098 
x31 Internal injury β0,31 0.069 0.021*** β1,31 -0.181 0.120 
       
  σ0 0.363 0.002*** σ1 0.716 0.048*** 
  ρ0 0.137 0.054** ρ1 -0.826 0.035*** 
Ho: ρ0 = ρ1 = 0; LR test = 25.02 (p = 0.000). 
N = 24,938; Log-likelihood= -14,756; AIC= 29,671; Schwarz criterion= 30,313. 
 (*) Base category is driver, x6. 
*** 1% significance level; ** 5% significance level; *10% significance level. 
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Table 4. Mean and standard deviation of alpha, lambda and delta indicators 
 
Indicator Description        Mean Std. Dev. 
1    1 0| |i i i iE y x E y x   1.562 0.213 
2     1 0| 1, | 1,i i i i i iE y I x E y I x    0.183 0.113 
3     1 0| 0, | 0,i i i i i iE y I x E y I x   1.625 0.189 
1     1 1| 1, | 0,i i i i i iE y I x E y I x    -1.330 0.098 
2     0 0| 1, | 0,i i i i i iE y I x E y I x   0.111 0.008 
1     1 1| 1, |i i i i iE y I x E y x   -1.273 0.125 
2     0 0| 0, |i i i i iE y I x E y x   -0.005 0.002 
3     1 1| 0, |i i i i iE y I x E y x   0.058 0.029 
4     0 0| 1, |i i i i iE y I x E y x   0.107 0.010 
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